Ceilings on lending rates remain a widely used policy tool that is intended to lower the overall cost of credit or protect consumers from exorbitant rates. Interest rate caps come in many forms and scopes and, according to their rationale, ceilings can affect a small segment or the overall market. Over the past years, many countries have introduced new or tightened existing restrictions, while only a few have removed or eased them. This paper takes stock of recent developments in interest rates caps globally and classifies them according to a novel taxonomy. The paper also presents six case studies of different types of interest rate caps. The case studies indicate that while some forms of interest rate caps can indeed reduce lending rates and help to limit predatory practices by formal lenders, interest rate caps often have substantial unintended side-effects. These side-effects include increases in non-interest fees and commissions, reduced price transparency, lower credit supply and loan approval rates for small and risky borrowers, lower number of institutions and reduced branch density, as well as adverse impacts on bank profitability. Given these potential negative consequences of interest rate caps, the paper discusses alternatives to reduce the cost of credit.
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Executive Summary
The economic and political rationale for putting ceilings on lending rates is to protect consumers from usury or to make credit cheaper and more accessible. If the primary rationale is consumer protection, ceilings are usually set at levels that only affect extreme pricing but leave the core market with minimal implications. In contrast, if interest rate caps are used as a policy tool to achieve certain socio-economic goals, such as lower overall cost of credit, ceilings are set at "binding levels" intended to influence the market outcome.
Ceilings on lending rates remain a widely-used instrument in many EMDEs as well as developed economies. Our analysis shows that at least 76 countries around the world, representing more than 80% of global GDP and global financial assets, impose some restrictions on lending rates.
These countries are not clustered in specific regions or income groups, but spread across all geographic and income dimensions. Of the countries with interest rate caps, a third introduced them to protect consumers from usury. This rationale is particularly used by highincome countries.
Interest rate caps are not static, but are an actively used policy tool. Since 2011, we find at least 30 instances when either new interest rate caps have been introduced or existing restrictions have been tightened. Over 75% of those changes occurred in low-or lower-middle-income countries. This outweighs the five instances when restrictions have been removed or eased and indicates that countries increasingly limit the maximum level of lending rates.
Interest rate caps come in many different forms. Restrictions used across countries vary substantially regarding what they cover and how they work. A novel taxonomy presented in this paper classifies interest rate caps according to the following features:
o Scope. A primary form of variation is the type of credit instrument/ institution and/or borrower they apply to. Caps can affect only a narrowly defined segment of the market (e.g. payday loans, credit cards, mortgages), cover loans by certain institutions (e.g.
MFIs or credit unions) or cover all types of credit operations in the economy. o Benchmark. Most countries using a relative cap link it to the level of an average market rate, for example, the average lending rate over the past six-months. Alternatively, the ceiling can be defined as a function of the central bank's policy rate, but this is less prevalent among the countries in our sample.
o Binding. Independently of the type of benchmark used, caps can be binding or nonbinding, i.e. they are below or above market rates. In countries where the primary aim is to prevent usury the ceilings are usually fixed at levels that affect only extreme pricing but leave the core market to operate with minimal implications.
o Fees. Some interest rate caps also explicitly regulate non-interest fees and commissions of the loan. This is either done by setting separate limits on non-interest costs or by defining the interest cap in terms of an annual effective rate (APR) that includes all fees and charges.
Establishing the causal effects of interest rate caps is challenging due to the heterogeneity of caps used and endogeneity concerns, but economic theory points to several possible side effects. Country case studies on Kenya, Zambia, Cambodia, the West African Economic and
Monetary Union (WAEMU), India, and the United Kingdom show that effects and side-effects depend on the type and specification of the cap.
o Caps set at high levels do not seem to affect the market and can help limit predatory practices by formal lenders. Non-binding caps, i.e. caps set well above market rates, affect only extreme pricing with little impact on the overall market. If interest rate caps include regulations on non-interest fees and the non-regulated lending market is limited, then caps are a potential way to remove predatory lenders in the formal sector.
o Binding caps set closely below market rates and that move with it might exert pressure on lenders to increase efficiency. Flexible caps set below market rates but not so low that lenders can no longer remain in the market and price risk appropriately, can put pressure on banks and MFIs to reduce administrative expenses and increase operational efficiency. This is especially true for markets that have high overhead costs. However, rising cost pressure on lenders can also come at the expense of brick and mortar networks, which may be negative for inclusion, if no alternative credit delivery channels are available. Moreover, calibrating interest caps at the "right" level to achieve operational efficiency is difficult.
o The effectiveness of caps is often undercut by the use of non-interest fees and commissions.
The increased use of non-interest charges often reduces price transparency and makes it more complicated for borrowers, especially those with limited financial literacy, to assess the overall costs of the loan.
o Binding caps set well below market levels can reduce overall credit supply. The extent of the decline depends on the scope of the restrictions. Whereas narrow caps affect primarily a clearly defined market segment, broad restrictions can reduce overall credit supply in the economy. Blanket caps further affect the distribution of credit as they result in a particularly large decline of unsecured and small loans, as well as in credit to SMEs and riskier sectors. Average loan size increases, suggesting a reallocation from small to large borrowers, in many cases to the government. The case studies suggest that the increase in non-interest income is often not enough to compensate banks for the drop in interest income and consequently aggregate data point to a fall in banks' interest income and an accompanied decline in profitability following the implementation of interest rate caps.
In light of the possible unintended consequences of interest caps, alternatives and complementary measures to interest rate caps should also be considered. These include measures to foster competition, reduce risk perception, overhead costs, and cost of funds.
Consumer protection and financial literacy measures are also important measures, especially if interest rates are meant to protect consumers from usury rates. 5
The economics of interest rate caps
Interest rate caps are by definition a government intervention in the marketplace and a response to perceived market failures. Interest rate caps either target exploitative rates charged to the most vulnerable borrowers, or the overall cost of credit in some market segments or the entire economy. In the first case, if the primary rationale is consumer protection, ceilings are usually set at levels that only affect extreme pricing but leave the core market with minimal implications. In contrast, if interest rate caps are used as a policy tool to achieve certain socio-economic goals, such as lower overall cost of credit, ceilings are set at "binding levels" intended to influence the market outcome.
For evaluating interest rate caps, it is important to gain an understanding of why lending rates are high in the first place. The interest rate charged on loans, in simplified terms, is the sum of five components: costs of funds, overhead costs (e.g. administrative costs of the bank as well as costs of processing the loan), risk premium, profits and taxes.
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Figure 1: Decomposition of interest rates
Source: Based on Miller, 2013 Profit: Caps on interest rates are often justified by the perception that high lending rates are driven by banks' ability to generate excessive profits from their lending activities. This ability to earn high profits is especially large when monopolistic or oligopolistic structures 6 together with high barriers to entry result in limited competition in the financial system and give incumbents the power to set prices. In such an environment, it is often argued that interest rate caps can help to protect the public interest by guaranteeing a fair and reasonable interest rate.
Risk perceptions:
High interest rates can also be driven by substantial risk premia on loans. Lenders calculate the risk premium based on the probability that a borrower repays the loan and the loss given default. In particular, for micro and small firms or households with no or little credit history and collateral it is difficult to accurately assess these parameters and the lack of information might result in high risk premia. This can give rise to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Unable to identify a borrower's potential for repayment, banks will charge an aggregated interest rate which will be more attractive to the higher risk client because lower risk clients are likely to have access to alternative and cheaper sources of credit.
This creates a higher risk of default and feeds back into higher risk premia and lending rates.
The problem is especially pronounced in less sophisticated financial systems where banks lack proper tools to price and manage risks efficiently. Moral hazard occurs when clients borrowing at this elevated rate are required to make riskier investments to cover their borrowing costs.
This also increases default probabilities and risk premia (Miller, 2013) . Caps on interest rates might alleviate this vicious cycle by altering the aggregate interest rates, making them also attractive for more credit worthy borrowers and reducing the pressure to engage in high risk projects to cover the borrowing costs.
Overhead costs: High lending rates can also be due to structural reasons such as high overhead costs that reflect the general administrative costs of the lender as well as the costs of processing the loan application. However, overhead costs are not only determined by lenders' productivity but also reflect the nature of their business models. Processing costs are, for example, generally higher for small loan volumes or microcredit transactions that require face-to-face interactions and where lenders use personal contacts as a substitute for formal collateral or computerized scoring (Helms and Reille, 2004) . Proponents of caps argue that ceilings on interest rates put pressure on banks to reduce administrative expenses and increase operational efficiency.
Cost of Funds:
The level of interest rates depends on the cost that financial institutions pay to borrow the funds they then lend out. At the macro level these funding costs, either the interest rate on deposits or the cost of wholesale funds, are a function of the prevailing "riskfree rate" in the economy and a premium reflecting the default risk of the institution. The "risk-free rate" reflects the fundamental equilibrium between savings and investment and is higher the scarcer the supply of capital in the economy is. Nominal rates are further influenced by expectations of future inflation. Caps on lending rates do not influence banks funding costs, but some countries try to reduce costs of funds by implementing caps on deposit rates.
Taxation:
Finally, the level of interest rates is influenced by explicit and implicit taxation.
Explicit taxation consists of the prevailing corporate tax rate in the jurisdiction that the bank operates in. Additionally, lending rates are impacted by implicit taxation, i.e. the opportunity costs of holding required reserves at the central bank. Reserve requirements are an implicit tax on banks if, as is usual, official reserves are remunerated at less-than-market rates (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999).
Overview of interest rates caps around the world
Collecting data on interest rate caps is inherently difficult as there are no "hard" quantitative data, they come in many different facets, and there is no uniform classification or data source. For this paper we look primarily at the existence of laws and regulations that de jure limit the level of lending rates for at least a part of the financial system. In addition,
we include countries where interest rates are de facto constrained, for example by subsidized rates from public banks or through some form of negotiated agreement. Who and Where? Figure 2 shows that the use of interest rate caps is widespread. At least 76 countries in all regions around the world use some form of restrictions on the level of interest rates on credit. As discussed in more detail in the following sections of this paper, the scope and form of these restrictions vary greatly across countries. They range from measures affecting only a small segment of the market to broad and binding restrictions that affect the overall macroeconomic environment. 
Recent trends
The headline number of restrictions is similar to past studies on the use of interest rate caps (see for example Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014) and more than 85% of the countries identified by Maimbo and Gallegos (2014) rates with a more flexible framework in 2014, and Thailand granted some exemptions from existing regulations and higher caps to "nano-finance" providers, a nascent segment.
Overall, new or tighter restrictions were predominantly implemented by low or lowermiddle income countries. Countries in those two income groups account for more than threequarters of all new or tightened caps. The majority of them tightened interest rate caps with the objectives to reduce the cost of borrowing. Less than one-third of the low and lowermiddle income countries tightened the interest rate cap too with the explicit objective to protect consumers from usury rates. In contrast, out of the five easing events, three are driven by upper-middle income countries. Several countries set special interest rate caps particularly for certain priority sectors of the economy. In Vietnam, for example, special rules apply to agricultural and rural lending.
Taxonomy of interest rate caps around the world
Similarly, Bolivia sets caps for loans for social housing and certain sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, mining and tourism.
9 https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/price-cap-high-cost-short-term-credit. See Section 5 for more details. 
Number of ceilings
Some countries use one blanket cap for all transactions. A potential problem with a single cap across all types of credit is that it can result in a dislocation of credit away from small or high-risk loan products. A cap set at a level that might be appropriate for large and secured loans can be too low for a sustainable provision of small loans to riskier borrows (FSDT Kenya, 2016) . Many countries try to mitigate this problem by using multiple caps. South Africa, for example, has seven separate ceilings for mortgages, credit facilities, unsecured credit transactions, development credit, short-term transactions, other credit and incidental credit agreements (see below). Also, in El Salvador, a usury law establishes interest rate caps across all financial institutions and for regulated and non-regulated MFIs, but applies different interest rates to the differing socioeconomic segments of the population. Interest rate restrictions do not only differ in scope but also in how they are calculated.
One important distinction is how the maximum level of interest that banks or other MFIs can charge is determined. There are two main ways of doing that. The first way is setting an absolute cap, i.e. a fixed nominal rate that may not be exceeded. We find evidence that at least 26 countries rely on absolute interest rate caps. Two-thirds of the countries using absolute caps are either low or lower-middle income countries, with only few high-income countries using them. The level set by absolute caps varies substantially. The Republic of Korea, for example, applies an absolute cap of 24% per annum, Thailand of 28% per annum, and Jamaica uses a cap of 40% per annum. As mentioned above, most countries in our sample do not use a single absolute limit, but have multiple, different caps based on the size, or type of loans, the socio-economic characteristics of the borrower, or the industry. 11 See Section 5 for more details on India. 
Binding or non-binding and all-inclusive costs
Independently of the type of benchmark used, a key question is whether the caps are binding in a sense that they are set at levels below market rates. In countries, where the primary aim of the restriction is to prevent usury this is usually not the case and ceilings are fixed at very high levels that affect only extreme pricing but leave the core market to operate with minimal implications. In the European Union, for example, caps are generally set at a substantial percentage above the average market rate for certain product groups, ranging between 33% (France), 50% (Italy) and 100% (Germany). 12 In contrast, when interest rate caps are used as a policy instrument to achieve certain socio-economic goals, such as lower cost of credit or more competition in the banking sector, ceilings are set below market rates. Such binding constraints amount to direct price setting and can alter the structure of the market if effectively enforced (FSDT Kenya, 2016 
De-facto constraints
Not all types of interest rate caps are formally codified into law. In our sample, four countries de facto depress the level of interest rates in other ways. In Brazil, banks must allocate a certain share of their demand deposits to loans to particular market segments, such as housing, agriculture and microcredit, each of which has a respective cap on interest rates.
In addition, loans made with second-tier funding from the Brazilian Development Bank also face ceilings. 15 Rules on on-lending also apply in Sri Lanka. Financial institutions borrowing from the state-owned savings bank, which is a major source of local funding to microfinance borrowers primarily in the informal sector, are not allowed to on-lend funds at a rate exceeding 12% of their own borrowing costs. In the Philippines, banks have a "gentlemen's agreement" that caps the spread of bank lending to a maximum of 5 percent over the 91-day T-bill rate. 16 Estonia has no official interest rate caps, but court practice has shown that courts will intervene if the level of interest payments in comparison to the principal is unreasonably high.
Potential economic impact of interest rates caps
The multiplicity of types and variations of interest rate caps used across countries makes a quantitative analysis of their effects challenging (see box 1 below). This said, economic theory points to possible unintended consequences that can undermine the policy goal. If interest rate caps are set so low that lenders cannot recoup at least their cost of funding and overhead costs and make a non-zero risk adjusted return, it will not be economically viable for them to lend. If binding restrictions apply exclusively on the level of nominal interest rates, banks and MFIs may try to compensate for the impact of mandatory low rates by increasing non-interest fees and charges related to the loan. This can also be done by a bundling of products and requiring borrowers to buy costly additional services, such as credit insurance, in order to obtain a loan. Such "hidden extra costs" reduce transparency and make it more difficult for borrowers, especially those with limited financial literacy, to assess the overall cost of borrowing and "comparison shop" for loans (Helms and Reille, 2004) .
Another response of lenders to low interest rate caps is to reduce credit extension.
Studies (e.g. Staten, 2008) show that credit supply is highly elastic to price changes and consequently a ceiling resulting in lower lending rates can trigger a swift reduction in the quantity of loans available. The reduction in credit supply caused by interest rate caps may not be uniform across borrowers, but fall predominantly on high-risk borrowers. In particular, too low ceilings on lending rates can lead to a reallocation from small borrowers to large commercial borrowers or the government, which are less risky and cheaper to administer (IMF, 2017). As lending institutions move to larger loan sizes to be more efficient, clients can also feel pressed to increase their borrowing amounts in order to maintain access to external finance. This can result in borrowing amounts exceeding the client's repayment capacity and thus, increase the risks of over indebtedness. In the micro-finance context, where lenders often expand outreach by funding network expansion through profits from existing 17 The Global Microscope database covers only 55 emerging and developing countries.
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borrowers, interest rate caps can force lenders to stop expanding or even withdraw services to remote rural areas and focus instead on urban areas that are less expensive to service (Miller, 2013) . Cut off from the formal financial system, small borrowers may be forced to turn to informal lenders, which are not regulated and charge substantially higher rates. Interest rate caps can thus run counter to their stated objectives of increasing affordable access to credit, especially for poor and underprivileged customers. General uncertainties about the implementation of new or changes to existing caps can also have impacts on financial intermediation, and ultimately limit credit.
Additional potential side effects stem from the resources needed to monitor and enforce compliance with the cap. In countries with scarce supervisory capacities, the requirements to monitor the cap can divert resources and limit the ability of supervisors to discharge their primary responsibilities. Lastly, at the macroeconomic level caps on lending rates can reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. For example, if ceilings are linked to the policy rate and the central bank were to lower policy rates to stimulate credit growth, the accompanied decline in the lending rate ceiling would counter the intended effect on credit growth and economic activity.
The case studies below aim to shed some light on the economic impact of interest rate caps in selected countries.
Country Case studies: Kenya, Zambia, Cambodia, WAEMU, India and the United Kingdom
Given the difficulties in conducting a quantitative analysis of the impact of interest rate caps in a cross-country setting (see Box 1), we turn in this section to study the effects in six particular cases. These specific country case studies allow us to study the economic impact of clearly defined changes to interest rate restrictions based on events analysis. The case studies The selection of case studies is geared towards analyzing different variations of recently implemented interest rate caps and based also on data availability. Table 2 uses the taxonomy developed in Section 3 to classify the caps used in those countries along their key characteristics. Average lending rates by June 2017. Consequently, parallel to a decline in the average rate level, the dispersion of rates across banks diminished. The standard deviation decreased from 2.1 to 1.4 and the difference between the 90 th and 10 th percentile lending rate dropped from 3.7% to 1.9%.
These observations suggest that the cap is binding in a sense that most banks had to reduce rates to comply with the new regulation. Price differentiation across commercial banks widely vanished with almost all institutions setting lending rates closely below the 14% cap.
The stated interest rate, however, does not cover the full cost of credit. A more comprehensive measure of the cost of credit is the annual percentage rate (APR), which additionally includes all fees and commissions charged by lenders. The figure below shows the distribution of APRs for a sample of 26 commercial banks in Kenya as of mid-November 2017.
The APR of all banks is higher than the 14% interest rate cap. The average APR stands at 18.5% and the maximum is 27.5%. More than half of the banks charge an APR of more than 18%, indicating that fees and commissions increase the effective cost of the loan by at least 4 percentage points. The KBA further observes that as a consequence of the interest rate cap, credit is more skewed towards the secure and short-term market end. Lenders are moving away from households and SMEs that lack collateral and instead lend to the government. Lending to the government is a particularly attractive alternative due to the high sovereign bond yields. Yields on "risk-free" 1-year and 5-year government bonds are between 11% and 12.6% and thus only slightly below the 14% lending cap. The decline in credit supply stands in contrast to an apparent increase in demand. Roughly one-third of banks state that credit demand has picked up since the introduction of the interest rate cap.
Zambia: Implementation and repeal of differentiated caps
The Bank of Zambia introduced interest rate caps in January 2013 with the objectives of increasing access to finance for SMEs, reducing over-indebtedness and reducing the cost of borrowing, although real lending rates appeared broadly in line with the regional median. The maximum lending rate for banks was set at a 9 percentage point margin over the policy rate of the Bank of Zambia. Non-banks (regular MFIs) and development MFIs were allowed to charge a factor of 1.644 and 2.303, respectively, times the bank interest rate ceiling. With the policy rate standing at 9.25% at the time of the implementation of the cap, this resulted in ceilings of 18.25%, 30% and 42%, respectively. 22 In all cases, ceilings were binding as they were set at a level below the prevailing market rate. 23 In November 2015 the Bank of Zambia reversed course and removed all ceilings on lending rates and allowed institutions to set rates freely.
During the period that the cap was effective, credit growth in Zambia slowed substantially. 24 The decline was especially pronounced for credit extended by MFIs, as the capped interest rates were less than half of their effective rates prior to January 2013 (FSDT Kenya, 2016) . The annual growth rate in net MFI loans dropped from 63% before the implementation of the law in December 2012 to 38% at the time the cap was repealed in late 2015. The right-hand panel of Figure 11 shows that following the implementation of interest rate ceilings, the ratio of fee income to interest income of MFIs increased. The ratio jumped from 5.8% in December 2012 to a peak of 18% in June 2014. This increase suggests that MFIs 26 tried to compensate for the lower interest rate by charging higher fees. Higher fees were also observed by an analysis of individual loan contracts, which also revealed that transparency suffered as banks stopped providing the total effective cost of the loan as an APR (World Bank, 2014) . The increase in fees was not always explicitly mentioned and non-interest fees were sometimes expressed as a ratio, making it difficult for customers with limited financial literacy to understand the full cost of the loan.
Figure 11: Effect of interest rate caps on in Zambia
Source: Bank of Zambia Data in Figure 12 suggest that following the implementation of the cap MFIs also tried to reduce overhead costs by increasing the average loan size -large loans are cheaper to administer -and thinning out their branch networks. The MFI sector experienced some consolidation and several institutions, especially some consumer lending MFIs that had charged very high rates prior to the cap, exited the market.
In November 2015 the Bank of Zambia removed all caps and issued a circular on the disclosure of fees to promote transparency in pricing. Assessing the direct impact of the repeal is difficult as it coincided with a period of significant economic distress in Zambia, which strongly affected the financial sector and impacted interest rates. Still, data suggest that following the repeal lending rates started to increase, for SME loans the median spread over the policy rate rose from the capped 9% Net loan growth (% yoy)
Bank loans MFI loans decline. Average monthly maintenance fees, for example, dropped by around one-third over these two years. The repeal of the cap, however, did not change the trend of slowing credit growth, which continued throughout 2016 as Zambia continued to struggle with the economic fallout from lower copper prices, El-Nino related effects on agriculture, fiscal challenges and a sharp depreciation of the domestic currency. The regulation came despite a report published by the NBC in November 2016 warning about the potential negative effects of interest rate caps on credit extension to small borrowers. Number of non-bank financial instituion branches
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Following the implementation of the cap, nominal lending rates of MFIs decreased and interestingly also lending rates by deposit-taking banks, which were mostly not subject to the cap, 28 converged towards the 18% level. Initial data on MFI lending activity show that the number of borrowers decreased by around 45,000, or 2.5%, between January and August 2017. Over the same period the average loan size increased, suggesting that fewer small loans were disbursed and MFIs tried to reduce costs and increase the efficiency of their lending operations. the levels of the caps were revised downwards by the BCEAO. For banks, ceilings went from 18% to 15% and for microfinance institutions they went from 27% to 24%. 29 Before the downward revision real lending rates were substantially higher than the Sub-Saharan Africa median. 28 The cap applies to microfinance deposit-taking institutions but not to commercial banks. The figures above show that following the decision to reduce the rate ceiling in early 2014 average lending rates in the region dropped, suggesting that the lower ceilings were binding. The average rate on loans declined from 10.7% in 2013 to 9.1% in 2014 and continued to fall to 8.8% in 2015. 30 Lower lending rates resulted in decreasing interest margins for banks.
The average interest rate margin in WAEMU in 2014 was more than 20% lower than in the previous year and continued to fall in 2015. Parallel to falling interest rate margins, the profitability of the banking sector took a hit after the ceilings on interest rates were lowered. However, a report by the Consumer Finance Association (CFA) highlights that from the start of 2014 until mid-2015 the acceptance rate at the final stage of the loan application fell from 50% to around 30%. 39 This led to many consumers losing access to the credit that they had in the past. Declined loan applicants were on average younger, more likely to be 38 The decline in borrowers cannot be linked entirely to credit supply reductions as also fewer people applied for loans due to improved financial performance, less marketing by lenders, etc. o Lower number and branch density of MFIs. Binding caps for microfinance institutions, either caps directly targeted at the industry or undifferentiated, economy-wide caps that are primarily designed for banks and hence set at levels too low for MFIs, are followed by a reduction in the overall number of microfinance institutions in the market as well as a reduction in branch density. This may be negative for financial inclusion if no alternative delivery channels are available.
o Caps set at high levels do not seem to affect the overall market and can help limit predatory practices by formal lenders. Non-binding caps, i.e. caps set well above market rates, affect only extreme pricing with little impact on the overall market. Such caps can protect consumers from excessive borrowing costs and help to reduce default rates and overindebtedness, especially if the non-regulated market is small. However, even caps set well above market rates can result in the exclusion of some high-risk borrowers.
o Pressure to lower operating costs and increase efficiency. If ceilings on interest rates are set at binding levels that are not so low that lenders can no longer remain in the market and price risk appropriately, they can put pressure on lenders to reduce administrative expenses and increase operational efficiency, especially if alternative delivery channels are available. However, calibrating the cap at the "right" level is difficult.
o Adverse impact on bank profitability. Aggregate data point to a fall in banks' interest income and an accompanied decline in profitability following the implementation of interest rate caps.
Alternatives to interest rate caps
Given these potential negative side effects of interest rate caps it is worth considering alternative ways for reducing interest rates. The optimal solution depends on the intended policy goal.
If the intended policy goal is to reduce the overall cost of credit in the economy or segments thereof, alternative solutions should be based on the source of the distortion causing the "excessive" rates e.g., lack of competition, risk perception, overhead costs, or macroeconomic considerations. To this end, an effective credit monitoring mechanism is essential for providing disaggregated data on underserved segments and pin pointing the type of distortion.
Lack of competition (excess profits):
If incumbent banks and MFIs enjoy significant market power allowing them to earn high profits by setting elevated rates, lending rates can be reduced by fostering competition in the financial sector. The paradigm is that competition between financial institutions should force them to compete on the price of loans that they offer and hence reduce interest rates. Competition can serve to bring down profit margins and/or reduce overhead costs by improving efficiency (Miller, 2013) . Helms and Reille (2004) show that increases in competition were the main reason for declining lending rates in Bolivia, Bosnia, Cambodia and Nicaragua. Limited competition in the financial sector is not necessarily 37 due to collusive behavior of incumbent banks, but often the result of structural weaknesses in the legal and institutional framework that prevent, for example, the orderly resolution and exit of weak banks or provide implicit subsidies for "too-big-to-fail" systemic banks. If that is the case, strengthening regulatory and supervisory capacities can help to alleviate these shortcomings and to reduce rates by fostering competition.
Risk premium (risk perceptions):
If the main reason for high interest rates is information asymmetry resulting in large risk premia, solutions should focus on addressing the underlying information gaps. The promotion of credit bureaus can be a useful policy approach to facilitate access to more detailed financial records of potential borrowers and help to reduce risk premia and banks' screening costs (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014) . In countries without comprehensive national identification systems, promoting ways to reliably and costeffectively verify a borrower's identity are also important measures to reduce information asymmetries. Risk premia can also be reduced by more efficient loan foreclosure procedures, including the introduction of small claim procedures, summary procedures for uncontested debt, or alternative dispute resolution procedures, that allow banks to limit the losses stemming from default of the borrower (Beck and Fuchs, 2004) . Risk premia can also be lowered by choosing the appropriate lending technology, which Berger and Udell (2006) defines as a combination of primary information source, screening and underwriting policies/procedures, loan contract structure, and monitoring strategies/mechanisms.
Overhead costs: If high interest rates are driven by high general administrative costs, some of the policy measures mentioned above can reduce the application costs, i.e. credit bureau and reliable borrowers' IDs. With respect to credit delivery, measures to promote alternative delivery channels, such as agent networks, and to promote the digitalization of financial services in general can help reduce such costs.
Cost of funds:
In some instances, the underlying source of the distortions are large fiscal borrowing needs, in combination with shallow domestic debt markets and limited access to global debt markets, that drain liquidity and push up Treasury yields. As the government yield curve serves as the risk-free benchmark to price financial products and often as the de-facto floor for wholesale deposits of the relevant maturities in an economy, Treasury yields affect banks' costs of funds and ultimately their lending rates. Addressing this source of distortion requires a holistic macroeconomic solution, which includes effective fiscal and debt management frameworks as well as capital market development.
On the other hand, if the policy aim is to protect consumers from usury rates, alternative solutions should focus primarily on promoting financial consumer literacy and consumer protection. Financial literacy empowers borrowers to notice exploitative loan conditions more easily and can help to protect them from predatory lending. Another approach to protect borrowers from usury is to enhance transparency. Requiring financial institutions to disclose interest rates and loan conditions as well as preventing the use of "hidden costs and fees" also fosters competition and puts downward pressure on effective interest rates (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014) . Financial consumer protection can also be enhanced by debt counseling and redressal mechanisms for consumers.
While the policies described in this section tackle the root causes of interest rate caps, their implementation does require time and the impact will only be felt over the mediumterm.
